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Abstract 
WTO judges are proposed by the WTO Secretariat and elected to act as ‘judges’ if either approved by 
the parties to a dispute, or by the WTO Director-General in case no agreement between the parties has 
been possible. They are typically ‘Geneva crowd’, that is, they are either current or former delegates 
representing their country before the WTO. This observation holds for both first- as well as second 
instance WTO judges (e.g. Panelists and members of the Appellate Body). In that, the WTO evidences 
an attitude strikingly similar to the GATT. Whereas the legal regime has been heavily ‘legalized’, the 
people called to enforce it remain the same. 
Keywords 
WTO, dispute resolution, panelists, judicial appointments 
JEL Classification: K40 
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1. Introductory Remarks* 
In his monumental study of 1993, Hudec made a very persuasive claim to the effect that the WTO 
dispute settlement system did not transition to compulsory third party adjudication overnight. The 
GATT started as a ‘relational contract’ among few, like-minded players. Years of pragmatic 
judgments that followed, developed a trade ethos of respecting the agreed deeds, while deviations 
would be tolerated in the short run.  
The typical GATT Panelist would be a trade delegate usually present in Geneva when disputes 
arose. The advent of the WTO has not changed this picture. Both Panelists, as well as members of the 
Appellate Body (AB) are typically current or former national delegates. It is of course difficult to 
‘measure’ the impact that similar profiles might have on the shaping of outcomes. It is quite telling 
though, that whereas the WTO has been hailed as a departure from GATT’s pragmatism and the 
beginning of a new era–namely ‘legalization’–it is the people who largely contributed to the shaping 
of the GATT-era that are called to shape the new, changed image. 
In Section 2, we discuss the identity and function of WTO ‘judges’, and their selection process. In 
Section 3, we focus on the identity and role of clerks aiding them. It is in this Section where we 
present our thoughts regarding the incentive structure of WTO judges to dedicate time and effort in 
resolving disputes submitted before them. Section 4 recaps the main observations.  
2. Appointing Judges at the WTO 
2.1 Panelists 
2.1.1 Nomination  
According to the DSU: 
(a) three Panelists will serve a Panel, unless parties agree to a Panel consisting of five Panelists (Art. 
8.5); 
(b) it is the WTO Secretariat that has the initiative to propose Panelists (8.6); 
(c) it can propose Panelists from the indicative list (‘roster’) of Panelists which is kept at the WTO. 
WTO Members that can propose individuals for inclusion in the list, which divides the roster 
Panelists into ‘governmental’ and non-governmental (8.4); 
(d) if the parties agree with the Panelists proposed by the Secretariat, then the Panel will be 
established. Agreement of the parties is the sufficient condition to this effect. Nevertheless, if they 
disagree with respect to one or more Panelists proposed, then the complainant or the defendant can 
request from the Director-General (DG) of the WTO to establish or complete the Panel (8.7). 
Disagreements with proposed names must be based on ‘compelling reasons’ (8.6); 
(e) the right to request the DG to establish/complete the Panel cannot be exercised before 20 days 
from the establishment of the Panel have lapsed, e.g. 20 days from the date when the Dispute 
Settlement Body (DSB) has agreed to establish a Panel to adjudicate a particular dispute (8.7); 
(f) the DG has discretion to establish the Panel. He must consult with the Chairmen of the DSB and 
the competent committee, but does not have to follow their advice (8.7).  
                                                     
*
 We would like to thank Marco C.E.J. Bronckers, Julie Pain, and Rhian-Mary Wood-Richards for graciously commenting 
on previous drafts, and for spending time answering to our many questions. 
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In practice, all Panels established in the WTO-era so far have been composed of three Panelists, 
though a panel of five is an option.  
The parties can reject the nomination of Panelists only for ‘compelling reasons’. Practice–which we 
visit infra–suggests that requests to the DG to ‘complete’ the Panel happen very frequently. This 
should mean that either ‘compelling reasons’ arise too often (and then maybe the legislator had 
underestimated the frequency of occurrence), or that this term has been interpreted in a rather relaxed 
manner.  
It is very difficult to indulge any further in this area, which belongs to the sphere of private 
information: proposals for Panelists take place behind closed doors. One thing is for sure. Nationality 
emerges as one ‘compelling reason’. There is only one case–US-Zeroing (EC)–where nationals of a 
litigating party served in a Panel. In this case, Bill Davey (US national) and Hans Beseler (German 
national) served together as Panelists in a dispute between the EU and the US.
1
  
The DG customarily meets not only with the two Chairmen (Dispute Settlement Body, General 
Council), but also with the members of the WTO Legal Service, and/or Services or Rules Division (if 
the case concerns trade in services, or contingent protection) when establishing the Panel. The DG has 
to consult but does not need to agree with anyone when ‘composing’ the Panel. The DSU does not 
include any ‘checks and balances’ regarding the manner in which the DG will perform his/her choice. 
As a result, we can only go by ‘revealed preferences’ and observe the people that have eventually got 
the nod.  
2.1.2 Who Gets the Nod? 
We provide our Panelists’ classification in order to facilitate the discussion and provide some 
hopefully useful conclusions. We make a general division across Panelists depending on whether the 
Panelists’ main employer is governmental or non-governmental. We further subdivide non-
governmental into academic or private practice. Finally, we check whether Panelists were or have 
been a Geneva resident (a longer stay) at the time of their appointment, for both categories. 
We thus, try to capture not only the nature of their link–if any–to a particular WTO Member but 
also the nature of their link to the WTO. While we use employment as proxy for the former, we use 
‘Geneva presence’ as proxy for the latter.  
During the period 1995–2014 a total of 245 Panelists have served on 224 Panels. This number 
(245) defines our sample. We have a dispute-Panelist dyad (or ‘Panel appointments’) of 672 (since 
three Panelists serve on a Panel).  
Only 30% of all Panelists have been chosen from the indicative list. Note though, that 77 Panelists 
were not on the indicative list at the time of appointment, but were added on afterwards.  
Around 60% of the total number (245), were in the service of their government at the time of their 
appointment. This number needs correction though, as we detail in what immediately follows.  
Non-governmental Panelists represent 40% of the total number, of which 25% were private sector 
employees at the time of their appointment (mostly private consultants or lawyers in private practices), 
whereas 15% were academics.  
58% of the non-governmental Panelists have been formerly (e.g. before the time of their 
appointment) in the service of their government. Were we to control for this number, then roughly 
three quarters (74%) of all Panel appointments include government or former government officials. 
                                                     
1
 This happens routinely though before the AB. In the GATT years, nationals did serve on occasion on Panels. Bob Hudec 
for example, a US citizen, served as Panelist in US-Customs User Fee; Andy Lowenfeld (US), and Pierre Pescatore 
(Luxembourg) served as Panelists in US-Section 337, a dispute between the EU and the US.  
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Prior to their first Panel appointment, 66–76% of all Panelists had previously been in contact with 
WTO in some capacity and/or were current residents in Geneva. This includes Panelists that took part 
in GATT and its negotiations. We can only provide a range for this statistic, since it is unfortunately 
more unreliable than employment at the time of appointment.
2
 
What about the education of Panelists? We should state at the outset that the disclosure of personal 
data is highly asymmetric across Panelists, and correcting through web search is not a perfect 
substitute for official disclosures. We thus were unable to find out the educational background for 33% 
of all Panelists.  
With this caveat, we note that 40% of all Panels have had Panelists with a legal background, albeit 
with various levels of legal education/law degree. 16% of all Panelists have an economics background, 
the overwhelming majority being Economics majors in undergraduate studies, e.g. without a Master’s 
or Ph.D. in economics. 12% of all Panelists have acquired other degrees, e.g. history, political science, 
geography etc. 
2.1.3 Remuneration 
The DSU does not say much about remuneration of Panelists, other than (8.11): 
Panelists' expenses, including travel and subsistence allowance, shall be met from the WTO 
budget in accordance with criteria to be adopted by the General Council, based on 
recommendations of the Committee on Budget, Finance and Administration. 
In practice, following an unofficial ‘memorandum’ dating from 1992, the following applies: 
(a) governmental Panelists do not get reimbursed for Panel work. They will get reimbursed for 
travelling, if they are not Geneva-based; 
(b) non-governmental Panelists will get reimbursed 600CHF/day of work. They will also receive a 
437CHF/day per diem to cover expenses incurred when participating in Panel hearings in Geneva. 
Finally, they can request money for work done in preparation of meetings. In the overwhelming 
majority of cases, anecdotal evidence suggests that they do not request honoraria for more than 10 
days per dispute, paid at 600CHF/day.
3
 
2.1.4 Function 
Panels have standard terms of reference, unless if agreed otherwise by the parties to a dispute, namely 
(Art. 7 DSU): 
To examine, in the light of the relevant provisions in (name of the covered agreement(s) cited by 
the parties to the dispute), the matter referred to the DSB by (name of party) in document ... and to 
make such findings as will assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings 
provided for in that/those agreement(s). 
This is hardly a self-interpreting statement and it says nothing about sources of law they can use, 
standard of review etc. One thing is clear: Panelists are ‘agents’ with a limited mandate; they are not 
‘principals’. They must ensure the ‘policy space’ committed to the WTO by the ‘principals’, the WTO 
Members. Art. 3.2 DSU reads to this effect: 
Recommendations and rulings of the DSB cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations 
provided in the covered agreements. 
                                                     
2
 Unless they clearly state in their curriculum vitaes, official biographies or if they have or had employment as a WTO 
delegate or similar it can’t be conclusively determined what kind contact they have had with Geneva in general, WTO in 
particular. Undetermined are around 12% (78 panel appointments) for this variable. 
3
 The WTO is non-transparent in this respect, and the information we have included here is based on interviews with 
former Panelists.  
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To this effect, they will issue ‘recommendations’ when a violation has been established, and may issue 
‘suggestions’ as well (Art. 19 DSU). The former have standardized content, namely (Art. 19.1 DSU): 
that the Member concerned bring the measure into conformity with that agreement. 
Suggestions do what their name indicates: they ‘suggest’ specific ways to achieve compliance, e.g. to 
bring measures into conformity with the WTO. They are optional, and non-binding. Although 
transaction costs could be heavily reduced if followed, WTO Members can lawfully disregard them. 
Practice evidences that they have been followed a few times only so far.
4
  
2.2 ABMs (Appellate Body Members) 
2.2.1 Nomination 
A Preparatory Committee was established (where delegates at the DSB could participate) in order to 
decide on the selection process for the members of the AB. Following a recommendation by this body, 
the DSB
5
 decided that an organ be established comprising the DG of the WTO, and the Chairmen of 
the General Council, the DSB, the CTG (Council for Trade in Goods), the CTS (Council for Trade in 
Services), and the TRIPs (Trade-related Intellectual Property Rights) Council. This organ would be 
receiving propositions for nominations by WTO Members and at the end, propose to the DSB its 
nominees. It is the DSB that would appoint the members of the AB.
6
 Individuals are nominated for a 
four year term, which is renewable once. 
Art. 17.1 DSU states that three rotating members of the AB (a division) will hear a case. The 
formula for selection of a division is not reflected in the DSU or in the AB WP (Working Procedures), 
and is unknown to the wider public (Rule 6 WP).
7
 A presiding member for each division will be 
selected (Rule 7 WP). Although a division hears and decides a particular case (Rule 3 WP), a practice 
of collegiality has developed. In an effort to promote consistency and coherence in decision-making, 
Rule 4 WP reflects the so-called collegiality-requirement: according to its § 3, the members of a 
division will exchange views with members of the AB who do not participate in their division on the 
resolution of the dispute before them. The final decision of course will be taken by the members of the 
division alone. 
  
                                                     
4
 Mavroidis and Wu (2012) include a list of suggestions issued during 1995–2012. We discuss the precedential value of 
reports infra. 
5
 Elsig and Pollack (2014) discuss all this in detail.  
6
 WTO Doc. WT/DSB/1 of June 19, 1995. 
7
 Anecdotally, it seems that on its appointment, each member of the AB receives a number. A combination of three 
numbers, rotating according to a secret formula, will hear appeals as they are coming to the AB. For example, numbers 1, 
2 and 5 will hear appeal against DS 1, numbers 2, 6 and 9 will hear appeals against DS2 and so on. What is unknown is 
the formula for rotating the divisions. 
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2.2.2 Who Gets the Nod?  
The following table is a complete list of former and current AB Members up until February 2015 
Table 1: Appellate Body Members 
Name #Disputes Nationality Term of Office Property Former 
Panelist 
Panelist 
after AB 
Abi-Saab 28 Egypt 2000–2008 A 
  
Bacchus 34 US 1995–2003 FG/P 
  
Baptista 17 Brazil 2001–2009 P 
 
Yes 
Bautista 8 Philippines 2007–2011 FG Yes 
 
Beeby 12 New Zealand 1995–2000 FG 
  
Ehlermann 27 EU 1995–2001 FG 
  
El-Naggar 14 Egypt 1995–2000 A/P 
  
Feliciano 25 Philippines 1995–2001 A/FG 
  
Ganesan 25 India 2000–2008 FG Yes 
 
Hillman 13 US 2007–2011 FG 
  
Janow 9 US 2003–2007 A/FG Yes 
 
Lacarte-Muró 27 Uruguay 1995–2001 FG Yes Yes 
Lockhart 19 Australia 2001–2006 FG/P 
  
Matsushita 16 Japan 1995–2000 A 
  
Oshima 8 Japan 2008–2012 FG 
  
Sacerdoti 24 EU 2001–2009 A 
  
Taniguchi 20 Japan 2000–2007 A 
  
Unterhalter 10 South Africa 2006–2013 P Yes 
 
Graham* 4 US 2011– FG/P 
  
Ramírez-Hernández* 20 Mexico 2009– FG 
  
Chang* 7 Korea 2012– A 
  
Bhatia* 11 India 2011– FG 
  
Van den Bossche* 11 EU 2009– A 
  
Zhang* 16 China 2008– FG Yes 
 
Servansing* 0 Mauritius 2014- FG 
  
*Current AB Members. 
A few observations seem warranted: 
(a) the preference for former government officials (over 60% of all appointments) is clear and it cuts 
across trading partners, in the sense that all of them share this preference; 
(b) practitioners and academics are more or less of equal number, and definitely a minority across all 
appointments; 
(c) fourteen WTO Members have shared all AB members. EU, Japan, and the US have appointed 
three each; Egypt, India, and Philippines, two each; Australia, Brazil, China, Korea, Mexico, New 
Zealand, South Africa, and Uruguay have appointed one member each; 
(d) there has never been an AB term without an EU or US member. 
Louise Johannesson and Petros C. Mavroidis 
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The typical AB Member is male, with tenure of around 75 months (6 years) with 16 disputes during 
that time. Most likely, he/she is a former government official and 60 years of age at the start of the 
term of office. 
Figure 1: Average number of disputes adjudicated by AB Member. 
 
2.2.3 Remuneration 
The lack of transparency that we observed with respect to the remuneration of Panelists is evident here 
as well. WT/DSB/1, the Decision Establishing the AB cited supra, reads in §12: 
The amount of a retainer/fee package would have to be large enough to offset a member’s 
opportunity cost of work foregone because of potential conflicts of interest, or incompatibility with 
sporadic trips to Geneva. … the compensation should be high enough to provide an incentive for a 
member not to take on work which might create a conflict of interest. Accordingly, it would 
appear that the retainer should be set at a minimum of SF 7,000 per month, plus a fully-adequate 
daily fee, travel expenses and a per diem. The actual amounts should be set on the basis of further 
research on current rates for equivalent services under similar conditions. 
The wording might suggest that members of the AB will be paid asymmetrically, since the opportunity 
cost cannot be the same say for a practicing attorney in a leading law firm, and a mid-level bureaucrat. 
In practice though, they are paid the same amount for work done. Work done however, can be 
asymmetric for two reasons: 
(a) the formula for appointment in a Division is unknown. Empirically however, we know that some 
AB members have been appointed more often than others, as our Table 1 shows; 
(b) besides the 7,000 Swiss francs per month (which have been adjusted since 1995), AB members 
can request compensation for work done at home on any given case. The compensation is fixed at 
around 780CHF/day of work. The amount of compensation requested depends on various factors 
ranging from the complexity of the case to the personal ethics of individuals involved.  
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It seems that they are paid on yearly basis more than the stated supra statutory sum, but it is highly 
unclear (because of lack of transparency) who gets paid what.
8
 
2.2.4 Function 
The AB decides in last resort. It hears appeals against Panel reports (Art. 17.1 DSU), can uphold, 
modify or reject appealed Panel findings (Art. 17.13 DSU) and in doing that must be limited to issues 
of law (Art. 17.6 DSU). Panels are the trier of facts; the AB cannot revisit facts in order to re-establish 
de novo the factual record. 
Since its review is based on issues of law–almost by construction–its function is to provide 
interpretations of the provisions that could–in principle–apply across cases. There is nothing binding 
stare decisis in the WTO legal system. De facto nevertheless, the system comes close to that. In US-
Stainless Steel (Mexico), the AB re-visited all prior case law and held that it expected Panels to follow 
prior AB findings dealing with the same issue (§158): 
It is well settled that Appellate Body reports are not binding, except with respect to resolving the 
particular dispute between the parties. This, however, does not mean that subsequent panels are 
free to disregard the legal interpretations and the ratio decidendi contained in previous Appellate 
Body reports that have been adopted by the DSB. In Japan—Alcoholic Beverages II, the Appellate 
Body found that: 
[a]dopted panel reports are an important part of the GATT acquis. They are often considered by 
subsequent panels. They create legitimate expectations among WTO Members, and, therefore, 
should be taken into account where they are relevant to any dispute. (italics in the original) 
In US-Shrimp (Article 21.5-Malaysia), the AB clarified that this reasoning applies to adopted AB 
reports as well.  
3. Support Mechanism: WTO Clerks 
3.1 Panel-Stage 
Art. 27.1 DSU reads: 
The Secretariat shall have the responsibility of assisting panels, especially on the legal, historical 
and procedural aspects of the matters dealt with, and of providing secretarial and technical support.  
Panels are aided by law clerks. Contrary to the US tradition, clerks are not assigned to individual 
judges but to the Panel as such. Law clerks have to pass a competition to this effect and join the WTO. 
That is, law clerks’ allegiance is to the WTO, its case law so far etc., and not to particular judges as is 
the case for example of clerks to the US Supreme Court. 
Practice suggests that–depending on the subject-matter and administrative capacity–different 
divisions will assist Panels. Typically, a Legal Officer and a Secretary assist Panels. The Legal Officer 
will be a member of the WTO Legal Affairs Division unless the dispute concerns a contingent 
protection instrument. In this case, the Legal Affairs Officer will be a member of the WTO Rules 
Division. A similar arrangement is in place whenever litigation focuses on trade in services. In such a 
case, a member of the WTO GATS Division will act as Legal Officer. 
                                                     
8
 WTO Doc. WT/DFA/W/115 mentions in p. 88 that AB expenditure for that year was 624,000 Swiss francs. This sum 
exceeds the statutory amount by at least 40,000 Swiss francs. Take into account that this was the budget for 2005. The 
budgetary prediction for 2015 is 2,000,000 Swiss francs that have been committed to the AB. 
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Secretaries are chosen from the ratione materiae competent Division, e.g. a member of the WTO 
Agriculture Division will act as Secretary in cases involving interpretation of the WTO Agreement on 
Agriculture.  
3.2 AB-Stage 
The AB as well, has its own Legal Service. The conditions for recruitment are identical to those for the 
WTO Secretariat.  
4. Black Cat, White Cat 
A famous Chinese proverb goes like this: 
Black cat, white cat, all that matters is that it gets the mice. 
‘Getting the mice’ is a whole new ball game in WTO dispute settlement system. Detailed rules 
regarding adjudication have been introduced, the legal framework has expanded exponentially as a 
result of the successful conclusion of the Uruguay round, and yet the identity of Panelists remains the 
same.  
This is counter-intuitive to say the least. The amount of case law produced by the WTO is quite 
substantial and keeping up with it is a full-time job. Since–as argued above–knowledge of case law is 
quintessential—as Panels are expected to follow it— one would expect that Panelists would be well 
versed in the intricacies of case law ranging from rules of origin to public health measures to 
intellectual property rights. How many members of national delegations can honestly claim expertise 
in the field as described above? 
We do not know the criteria of the Secretariat for selecting Panelists. Nordström (2005) hints that 
the influence of law clerks in drafting reports should not be under-estimated, although recognizes the 
limits of the factual record he has established.  
As stated above, it is the WTO Secretariat that has the incentive, the legal right indeed to propose 
Panelists. It is quite immaterial whether proposed Panelists are members of the roster or not, the right 
of the Secretariat is not circumscribed by similar concerns. Indeed, the Secretariat can disregard the 
expressed will of WTO Members by proposing non-roster Panelists. It is true that Panelists will not be 
appointed unless the parties agree to the proposals. Yet recall that in the lack of agreement it is the 
Secretariat again (this time the DG) that chooses who the Panelists in a given dispute will be and this 
time, agreement by the parties is not required for an appointment to be made.  
WTO Panelists are either unpaid for the service they provide or paid a modest—compared to 
market prices in the private sector—honorarium (600CHF/day). The majority of Panelists are 
government officials, who do the work for free. The WTO has not put in place any pecuniary incentive 
for Panelists that much is for sure. 
Think in terms of the opportunity cost as well. Government officials give up on their government 
work in order to resolve disputes. It is of course easier for large delegations to ‘take one for the team’ 
and distribute the work of the missing delegate between them. It is more difficult for smaller 
delegations. Horn et al. (2011) provide the numbers showing that delegates from EU, US (the large 
delegations) become Panelists about 10% of the time. Delegates from smaller delegations should thus 
have even less of an incentive to work as Panelists. And yet, they represent the ‘bulk’ of Panelists. 
Why not refuse then? Probably, they do not refuse because the appointment as Panelist is good for 
their career development. The best of both worlds for them is to accept nominations while 
‘outsourcing’ the work associated with the nomination. 
Black Cat, White Cat. The Identity of the WTO Judges 
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Consistency—assuming one is not consistently incorrect—is an incentive compatible structure for 
any adjudicating forum, since this is the best proxy for ‘independence’ and ‘impartiality’. For 
consistency to be thus served, expertise is necessary input. Expertise nevertheless, should not be taken 
for granted and it is more likely that it resides with members of the WTO Secretariat than with 
‘amateur’ judges.  
In ‘The Go-Between’, L.P. Hartley’s 1953 classic novel, the past is likened to a foreign country; 
‘they do things differently there’. When it comes to adjudication, the past is close to the Holy Grail. 
There are of course good arguments in favour of constant rotation of judges such as abating 
institutional bias. But there are equally good arguments in favour of consistency, although consistency 
is not a value per se. The key to the past is in the hands of the WTO Secretariat and not in the hands of 
one- or two time Panelists, as the majority of them are.
9
 The quest to be consistent will be highly aided 
by those who are not prepared to question the past, and this is an area where government officials have 
comparative advantage over doubting academics. 
Taking all this on board would suggest that the interests of amateur judges are best served when: 
(a) They can pride themselves that they have served as Panelists; 
(b) Panel time has not been too much of a distraction from their day to day occupation; 
(c) They have ‘outsourced’ the work associated with the preparation of the ‘issues paper’ that serves 
as basis for Panel deliberations, the drafting of award, the consistency of the award with prior 
rulings on the same issue to those with the expertise to do a good job, e.g. the members of the 
WTO Secretariat. 
The situation is probably a bit different with respect to members of the AB. Much of our discussion 
supra nevertheless, finds application there as well. All this to suggest that, while the Secretariat has no 
authority to interpret the various provisions in the WTO Agreement and should serve rather than lead 
the Panel, there are good arguments to suggest that the line between ‘serve’ and ‘lead’ is more a line in 
the sand rather than set in stone. 
  
                                                     
9
 Horn et al. (2011).  
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